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INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS AND CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY
STEPHANIE BEN-ISHAIt AND STEPHEN J. LUBBENt

The problem of involuntary creditors in corporate bankruptcy has been long
recognized, with little actual effort expended towards solving the matter.'
Instead, the issue of tort, environmental, and tax creditors is typically
acknowledged and then swept to the side by observing, "they should have a
priority."2 No effort is actually made to give them a priority-although tax
creditors typically already have a priority in both the United States and

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics, Seton
Hall University School of Law. Many thanks for the helpful comments received at the
2011 Annual Meeting of the European Law and EconomicsAssociation, and from Rachel
Godsill and Rgis Blazy. Ashley Butts, of Osgoode Hall, was the indispensible research
assistant on this project.

2

"It is by now a familiar point in the law review and finance literature that according full
priority to secured claims permits a firm to divert value from its tort creditors": Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M Fried, "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy" (1996) 105:4 Yale LJ 857 at 882.
Robert K Rasmussen, "Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering"
(2000) 98:7 Mich L Rev 2252 at 2269. See also Barry E Adler, "AWorld Without Debt"
(1994) 72:3 Wash ULQ811 at 826; Kathryn R Heidt, "Cleaning UpYourAct: Efficiency
Considerations in the Battle for the Debtor'sAssers in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies" (1988)
40:3 Rutgers L Rev 819 at 851-63; "Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of Tort
Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence" (2003) 116:8 Harv L Rev 2541
at 2562; Hanoch Dagan, "Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors
Should Be Preferred" (2004) 78:3 Am Bank LJ 247 at 277.
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Canada 3-rather, the observation simply removes an annoyingproblem with
the larger theoretical point being made about corporate bankruptcy.4
Moreover, the repeated use of this tactic ignores the ways in which
corporate bankruptcy has changed over the years, rendering even this
solution of limited value. In particular, the growth of secured credit means
that a priority claim, which simply bumps the creditor to the front of a large
group of unpaid unsecured creditors, is little more than a token, having no
real value. 5And more importantly, the trend of selling the corporate debtor's
assets before considering a reorganization plan means that even the limited
6
power that a priority creditor has will often be focused in the wrong place.
In particular, once the debtor's assets are sold, powers to vote on a plan are of
little import in a case that could just as easily be resolved by liquidation
under either the Bankruptcy andlnsolvencyAct7 (BIA) in Canada, or chapter
7' in the U.S.
In this paper, we focus on the particular concern that the preference for
quick sales over traditional reorganization cases might allow the debtor's
management to work with secured lenders to extract assets from the debtor
in a way that would not be possible in a "normal" bankruptcy case. In

3

This is not always so. For example, in Australia the taxing authority has a general

4

unsecured claim, coupled with strong rights against directors who fail to act in response
to growing financial distress.
Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull,"An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in Corporation Law" (1980) 30:2 UTLJ 117 at 117-19.

5

6

For a discussion of the growth of secured creditor power in U.S. chapter I1 cases, see
Douglas G Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, "Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance" (2006) 154:5 U Pa L Rev 1209 at 1236-37. See also RonaldJ
Mann, "Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit" (1997) 110:3 Harv L Rev 625 at 629;
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, "Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention" (2005) 118:4 Harv LRev 1197 at 1222.
For a detailed comparative discussion of quick sales see Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J
Lubben, "Sales or Plans: A ComparativeAccount ofthe 'New'Corporate Reorganization"
(2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 591 [Ben-Ishai & Lubben, "Sales or Plans"].

7

Bankruptcy and InsolvencyAct, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA].

8

11 USC §§ 701-84 (2006).
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particular, we examine how a quick sale can be used to cleanse assets of their
association with environmental claims.9
We also consider how the insolvency systems in our respective countries
might adapt to address this problem. Ultimately, the best protection for
involuntary creditors, including environmental creditors, is to maximize the
value of the debtor's assets. That counsels for improving stakeholders' ability
to monitor the sale process and ensure that the sale process in not rushed for
the sole benefit of senior creditors.
Throughout this paper, we examine the issue of quick sales and
involuntary creditors in both the U.S. and Canada. These two economies are
closely linked, and thus have corporate bankruptcy systems that, while still
unique, are amongst the most comparable of any two in the developed world.
More generally, as shown throughout the paper, the strengths and weaknesses
of each jurisdiction can inform the solutions we propose. Thus, we ultimately
suggest that Canada would be well served by adopting certain aspects of U.S.
law, and conversely, the U.S. would increase the efficiency of its corporate
bankruptcy system by taking insights from the Canadian system.
We begin by considering U.S. and Canadian law on involuntary creditors,
particularly environmental claims, in corporate reorganization proceedings.
As we show, the law in Canada is somewhat underdeveloped and vague,
which leaves open the possibility of abuse by the controlling parties in a
Companies'CreditorsArrangementsAct"0 (CCAA) proceeding. On the other
hand, while the law in the U.S. is more developed, that law is not much
clearer. This again puts the onus on environment regulators and other
involuntary claimants to protect their interests.
As we ultimately show, to the extent these creditors are separately
considered by U.S. or Canadian bankruptcy systems, the focus is typically on
the involuntary creditor's status as a claim holder in the proceeding. But in a
world where debtors routinely pledge all of their assets to senior creditors
before bankruptcy, and those assets are frequently liquidated before

9

See IIUSC § 363(f) (2006). See e.g. Re Trans World.Airlines nc, 322 F (3d) 283 (3d

Cir 2003).
'0

Companies'CreditorsArrangementAct,
RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA].
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consideration of a bankruptcy plan, this puts the emphasis too late in the
process.
We develop this argument in the second part of this paper, showinghow
the move to heavily pledged assets in turn facilitates creditor control of quick
sales in corporate reorganization proceedings. These quick sales allow for the
sale of assets free from involuntary claims in a way that would not be possible
outside of bankruptcy, or often even under a formal reorganization plan. The
risk we identify is that this heightened power to sell assets also undermines
the leverage of involuntary creditors, increasing the possibilities for senior
lenders to transfer wealth to themselves.
In the third part of this paper, we consider how U.S. and Canadian
procedures could be improved to guard against this risk.
We ultimately conclude that revising the U.S. and Canadian procedures
to outlaw quick sales or limit them to cases where the debtor's assets are
perishable is unlikely to be met with political approval in either jurisdiction,
or necessarily improve the outcome for involuntary creditors. However, as we
have argued elsewhere in a more general comparison of the two regimes,]
this is another instance where it would be helpful to draw on key aspects of
both systems-that is, the greater clarity provided for by the quick sale
regime under chapter 11 and the more flexible newly developed test under
the Canadian CCAA regime for approving quick sales. A more transparent
version of the new CCAA test-which requires judicial balancing of
interests-would provide a framework that involuntary creditors can begin
to adjust to in the new reality of quick sales versus plans.

I. THE LAW OF INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS:
A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT
In this part, we develop an understanding of the law of involuntary creditors,
with a particular focus on environmental creditors, whom we use as the
prototypical example for the rest of this paper. But first, a definition: What is
an involuntary creditor? Throughout this paper we use the term "involuntary
creditor" to refer to any creditor that lacks the ability to protect itselfexante.

11 See Ben-Ishai & Lubben, "Sales or Plans", supra note 6.
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This inability is typically the result of a lack of information: tort creditors do
not know they are or will be injured, environmental creditors do not have
full information about the conditions on private property, and taxing
authorities rely on debtors to provide information and may only obtain the
right to question that information years after liability has been created.
For purposes of this paper, we do not consider creditors that do not
contract to protect themselves as involuntary, even if the failure to contract is
the understandable result of information or transaction costs.' These
"maladjusting" creditors are likely to be the collateral beneficiaries of many of
the reforms we propose in Part III, but they are not our primary focus,
inasmuch as we focus on those parties that are affirmatively harmed by
modern corporate reorganization practices.
In both the U.S. and Canada, operating firms are subject to a variety of
federal and state or provincial environmental regulations. In the U.S., the
Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and LiabilityAct 3
(CERCLA) is the principal federal statute concerning the cleanup or
remediation of historical environmental contamination. The statute gives the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) numerous administrative and
judicial tools to address risks posed by historical contamination.
In addition to providing the EPA with the authority to undertake
response actions, CERCLA creates liability based on a "polluter pays"
principle. First, if the EPA or any other party cleans up a property, that party
can recover its costs from four categories of responsible parties: the present
owner and operator of the facility from which the hazardous waste was
released, the past owners and operators of those facilities at the time the
release occurred, the generators of hazardous substances who arranged for
disposal of their wastes at the site, and the haulers who took wastes to the
site. 4 In addition, the EPA has authority to require responsible parties to

12

Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1 at 880-92. See also Lynn M LoPucki, 'The Unsecured

13

Creditor's Bargain" (1994) 80:8 Va L Rev 1887 at 1897.
42 USC §§ 9601-75 (2006) [CERCLA].

"'

42 USCA § 9 6 07(a) (West, Westlaw through PL 112-104 (excluding PL 112-96 and

112-102)).
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perform cleanup actions themselves." Other federal statutes are generally
similar in coverage, but sometimes provide for different or more limited
6
remedies. For example, under the Resource ConservationandRecoveryAct1
the EPA can only seek injunctions or administrative orders requiring the
7
responsible party to take action-monetary damages are not available.'
The Canadian approach is somewhat similar, insofar as there are checks
in place designed to make the debtor company liable for the environmental
damage and contamination it causes. Specifically, provincial and federal
environmental protection statutes provide that a person who is in control of
a premises is liable for the costs of environmental remediation. 18 This is what
is known as the "polluter pays" principle in Canada, whereby the person who
is responsible for the damage is held accountable.
Moreover both of Canada's principal insolvency statutes-the BIA and
the CCAA-incorporate rules governing environmental claims; however,
within the insolvency context, it is worth noting that the usual
environmental liability rules in federal and provincial legislation are
modified, as will be discussed below. This contrasts with the U.S., where
environmental claims are not expressly mentioned in the Bankruptcy Code.'9
Despite the initial similarity between the Canadian and U.S. regimes, the
two jurisdictions differ in subtle ways with regard to how these cleanup
obligations are treated upon insolvency. In the U.S., the debtor's liability for
past cleanup work conducted by somebody else, whether the EPAor a private
party, is a general unsecured claim that can be treated as such during the
reorganization case." On the other hand, orders directing the debtor to clean

'5

16

17

42 USCA § 9606(a) (West, Westlaw through PL 112-104 (excluding PL 112-96 and
112-102)).
42 USC §§ 6901-92 (2006).
Randall James Butterfield, "Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under the
Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct: A Potential Solution to A Persistent Problem"
(1996) 49:3 Vand L Rev 689 at 710.

18 See e.g. EnvironmentalProtectionAct, RSO 1990, c E.19.
'9 11 USC§§ 101-1532(2006) [Bankruptcy Code].
See e.g. Ohio v Kovacs, 469 US 274 (1985) [Kovacs].

20
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up property are typically not considered claims, and as such are not
discharged at the end of the debtor's case.2' This latter rule can apply to
property that the debtor owned in the past, but no longer owns by the time
of bankruptcy, and clearly gives the EPA a strong incentive to avoid taking on
the cleanup work themselves.22
In Canada, the environmental authorities have somewhat better
protection for past remediation. This is because costs are secured by a
security interest on the real property affected by the environmental
conditions, as well as on any contiguous real property, and that interest is
given superpriority status over any other claim, right, charge, or security
against the property.23 The source for this superpriority status is found in
Canadas two principal insolvency and restructuring statutes, the BIAI and
the CCAAI.
Specifically, under these Acts, any federal or provincial governmental
claim against the debtor for the costs of remedying any environmental
damage affecting the real property of the debtor is secured by a charge on
that real property and any contiguous real property related to the activity
that caused the damage." Under the CanadianActs, the charge is enforceable
in the same way as a mortgage or other security on real property, and is given
superpriority over any other claim, right, charge, or security on the
property.25 Essentially, this amounts to a governmental superlien on the
debtor's property and provides these involuntary claimants with a better

21 See United States v Apex Oil, 579 F (3d) 734 (7th Cir 2009), Cert Den, 131 S Ct 67

22

(Mem 2010) [Apex Oil]; Re Chateaugay Corp, 944 F (2d) 997 (2d Cir 1991)
[Chateaugay].
See Re Torwico Electronics,8 F (3d) 146 (3d Cir 1993) [Torwico].

23

CCAA,supra note 10,s 11.8(8).

24

Ibid; BIA, supra note 7, s 14.06(7).

25

Ibid; see RoderickJ Wood, Bankruptcy andInsolvency Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at
415-16.
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priority status than what they would have received if the ordinary priority
26
rules were applied.
Under this scheme, the environmental condition or damage may occur
before or after the date that the debtor files for bankruptcy, or the date of
filing a plan under the CCA. 27 It is worth noting that
[i]f the environmental damage is extensive, the costs of the clean-up maybe
in excess of the value of the property. Compliance with the remediation
order in such cases will diminish the value of the assets available to the other
28
creditors who [have a] claim.
However, the policy rationale behind these provisions is that the party in
control of a property should be liable for the costs of any environmental
remediation necessitated by their occupancy. Accordingly, the environmental
remediation provisions in the BIA and CCAl reflect the polluter-pays
principle entrenched in federal and provincial incorporation legislation.29
With regard to presently contaminated property, the tables turn yet
again, as the U.S. prohibits the abandonment of contaminated property in
liquidation,3 ° and abandonment would seem to be pointless in a traditional
reorganization, because all property revests in the debtor at the end of a
chapter 11 case.3' Whilst in Canada, the trustee in bankruptcy or the CCAA
monitor may abandon environmentally damaged property, subject to certain

26

See Alexandria Pike, "Environmental Issues in Insolvency: Recent Developments"

27

at 488.
BIA, supra note 7, s 14.06(8); CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.8(9).

28

Wood, supra note 25 at 169.

29

See ibid at 141.

30

See e.g. MidlanticNationalBank v New JerseyDepartmentofEnvironmentalProtection,

(Davies, Ward, Phillips & Vinerberg LLP, 13 December 2010); Wood, supra note 25

474 US 494 (1986) (requiring trustee compliance with public health and safety laws that
prevent abandonment of contaminated property).
31

See Anne M Lawton & LyndaJ Oswald, "Scary Stories and the Limited Liability Polluter
in Chapter 11" (2008) 65:2 Wash & Lee L Rev 451 at 475.
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rules,3 2 and if this is done the monitor is not required to comply with a
remediation order.33 Moreover, under the Canadian system, the trustee or
monitor is not personally liable for any environmental condition that
occurred either before their appointment, or even after, unless the damage or
condition arose as a result of their gross negligence or misconduct."
The Ontario Superior Court ofJustice decision in Re GeneralChemical
CanadaLtd35 provides an example of the Canadian approach. The Court
considered the issue of environmental cleanup costs in the context of the
bankruptcy of a chemical company.36 Although the Ministry of the
Environment (MOE) of Ontario had claimed entitlement to costs related to
environmental cleanup of the debtor's property, the interim receiver for the
bankrupt estate had also brought a motion for the interim distribution of the
estate's assets. It is worth noting that the funds that the interim receiver
sought to distribute came from the operation of the debtor's business, as
opposed to real estate holdings." The MOE opposed the receiver's motion;
specifically, despite conceding that any secured claim it had attached only to
General Chemical's real property, it nevertheless maintained that both the
debtor and the receiver had "an obligation to take care of the cost of
environmental cleanup before any funds [were] paid out to [creditors]."38
However, the Court disagreed and granted the receiver's motion to
distribute the assets, holding that the Ministry was, in effect, an unsecured

32

Specifically, the trustee must elect to abandon the property by providing notice to the
authority who issued the order and, unless some other period is specified in the order, the
election to abandon must occur within ten days after the order is made. See Wood, supra

note 25 at 169.
33 BIA, supra note 7, s 14.06(4); CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.8(5).

35

BIA, supra note 7, s 14.06(2); CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.8(3).
Re GeneralChemical CanadaLtd, (2006) 22 CBR (5th) 298, 53 CCPB 284 (Ont Sup
Ct J) [GeneralChemical cited to CBR].

36

Ibidatparas 17-18.

34

37
3

bidat para 1.
Ibidat para 34.
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creditor who was not entitled to special priority for cleanup costs.39 This was
especially so, given that the assets that generated funds were not connected to
the property that had created the environmental damage; accordingly, the
Minister had no lien or priority over these funds. In its decision, the Court
observed that the EnvironmentalProtectionAct ° permits the MOE to issue
orders to a polluter to clean up polluted property. However, absent
exceptional circumstances, gross negligence, or misconduct on the part of the
trustee or receiver, the MOE is prevented from issuing orders to trustees
or receivers.4
Accordingly, this case established that the power of the government to
make environmental orders in the context of a bankruptcy is limited. It also
bears mentioning that in its decision, the Court observed that "[t]he MOE'S
right to review General Chemical's financial assurance and require changes to
it was ... stayed by the CCAAorder"-as General Chemical had first tried
to reorganize under the CCA4, before failing to do so and filing
for bankruptcy.42
In the appeal ofRe GeneralChemical CanadaLtd,43 the debtor's interim
receiver proposed a plan that was opposed by the MOE, on the grounds that
the debtor failed to comply with provincial environmental safety
requirements. As a result of this failure, the MOE claimed that there would
be significant cleanup costs that exceeded the debtor's financial assurance

39

Ibid at para 46. The Court went on to specify that, apart from its security, the MOE was
an unsecured creditor like any other and "must prove its claim in the General Chemical
bankruptcy. To permit the MOE to delay distribution to a secured creditor would give the
MOE a quasi-priority to other unsecured creditors, and would defeat or delay the
legitimate interests of secured creditors."

EnvironmentalProtectionAct, supra note 18.
4' General Chemical,supra note 35 at para 40.
40

42

Ibid at para 21. See also ReNortelNetworks Corp, 2012 ONSC 1213 at paras 101-06,
[2012] OJ No 1115 (QL) (Morawetz J held that the MOE orders were financial
obligations caught by the CCAA stay and the debtor did not need to comply with them).

43 HarbertDistressedInvestment Fund,LP v GeneralChemical CanadaLtd, 2007 ONCA

600, (sub nor Re General Chemical CanadaLtd) 228 OAC 385 [General Chemical
Appeal].
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under the Environmental Protection Act. In this case, it was the MOE's
position that the polluter-pays principle for environmental remediation
required that no distribution take place until there was an assurance that the
debtor's assets were sufficient to affect a cleanup.' However, the Court found
that in the face of section 14.06(7) of the BIA-which provides for priority
to be accorded to environmental cleanup costs-and section 14.06(8)which establishes that environmental cleanup costs are provable claims in
bankruptcy-the provincial environmental legislation was of no effect.'
Specifically, the federal bankruptcy legislation was held to be paramount over
the provincial regulations that the MOE was seeking to enforce. The Court
went on to hold that MOE was merely an unsecured creditor-albeit one
that had security over the debtor's real property, as provided for in the BIA.4"
As such, the interim receiver was allowed to proceed with distributing the
assets of the estate.
Before reaching the facile conclusion that the Canadian approach favours
past cleanup, while the American approach is better suited to protect
unaddressed contamination, let us provide a few complicating factors. First,
the inability of a liquidating American debtor to abandon contaminated
property is of little consequence if the debtor has no ability to pay to clean
up the property. Second, the Canadian superpriority lien is simply that-a
superpriority lien in a contaminated property. The ability to foreclose on
such a property is unlikely to be attractive.
Thus, the utility of each of these protections is apt to turn on the debtor's
need for the contaminated property, and the environmental claimant's ability
to turn that need into leverage in the reorganization process. But as we
discuss in the next section, new developments in corporate reorganization
practice in both the U.S. and Canada tend to undermine this power.

44

Ibid at para 43.

44

Ibid at para 46.

41

Ibid at para 47.
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II. INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS IN THE "NEW"CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY
Traditional corporate reorganization involves the acceptance of a plan by
creditors, with a concomitant reduction of the debtor's fixed claims and
realignment of its operations. In the U.S., this process is facilitated by an
automatic stay of actions against the debtor,46 and a similar stay is typically
entered in Canadian CCAA!proceedings.47 In chapter 11, unsecured creditors
are typically represented by a committee,48 while in CCAAI this role is taken
up by the monitor.49 The debtor formulates a plan, and the creditors then
vote on the same. 5 After the creditors approve the plan, the court will
consider the plan and, ifit meets the provisions of the statute, sanction it and
it becomes binding on all claimants. 5'
This traditional form of corporate bankruptcy is increasingly rare in
larger corporate insolvency cases. 2 Instead, debtors utilize their power to sell
their assets first, and then proceed to formulate a plan that distributes the
sale proceeds to creditors.53
Take, for example, the well-known case of Lehman Brothers. 4 The
Lehman holding company filed under chapter 11 in New York on 15
September 2008 and then sold office buildings and the North American
46

11 USC § 362 (2006).

47

CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.03.

48

11 USC§§ 1102-03 (2006).

49

CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.7.

'0 Ibid, s6(1); 11 USC§§ 1121, 1126(2006).
51 CCAA, supra note 10, s 6(1); 11 USC§§ 1129,1141 (2006).
52

See Ben-lshai & Lubben, "Sales or Plans", supra note 6. See also Re ChryslerLLC, 576 F

53

(3d) 108 at 115 (2d Cir 2009), rev'd on other grounds (2009), 130 S Ct 1015 (Mem
2009), citing Douglas G Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, "The End of Bankruptcy" (2002)
55:3 Stan L Rev 751 at 751-52 [Baird & Rasmussen, "Bankruptcy"].
CCAA, supra note 10, s 36; 11 USC § 363 (2006). See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Bankruptcy
Reforms: 2008 (Toronto: Carswell, 2008) at 59.

54

See Re Lehman Brothers Holdings,445 BR 143 (SDNY Bankr 2011); Securities Investor
Protection Corpv Lehman Brothers,2011 Bankr LEXIS 3765 (QL) (SDNYBankr 2011).
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investment-banking business to Barclays one week later. It recently confirmed
a plan that will distribute the proceeds of this and other asset sales to
creditors over time.
This change in approach has been attributed to the growing power of
secured lenders.55 This is particularly true in the U.S., where it is argued that
secured lenders have learned the lessons of the Eastern Airlines case-a major
airline case from the 1980s that is said to typify debtor control, and which
ultimately resulted in the eventual liquidation of Eastern 5 -and now
understand how they can use their prebankruptcy power over the debtor's
7
liquidity to control the chapter 11 process.
But this is more a story of how, than why.Aside from the implicit benefits
of avoiding a lengthy reorganization process, 5 8 the reasons for why this turn
to quick sales has happened, and whether it benefits anyone besides the
senior lenders, is still open to debate. 9 And some argue that the trend is
affirmatively harmful to the goal of maximizing the value of the debtor."
The nearest thing to a normative justification for quick sales has been
Baird and Rasmussen's argument that current American chapter 11 debtors
generally lack substantial debtor-specific value, and thus the sale of these
assets is apt to realize as much as any reorganization of the same.6 This "no

5

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, "The Control ofWealth in Bankruptcy" (2004) 82:4TexL
Rev 795.

5

See Benjamin A Berringer, "'It's All Just A Little Bit of History Repeating: An
Examination of the Chrysler and GM Bankruptcies and Their Implications for Future
Chapter 11 Reorganizations" (2010) 7:1 NewYork UniversityJournal ofLaw&Business
361 at 371.

57 See e.g. Baird & Rasmussen, "Bankruptcy", supra note 52.
58

See generally Lynn M LoPucki & Joseph W Doherty, ProfessionalFees in Corporate
Bankruptcies:Data,Analysis, andEvaluation(NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2011).

59 See Stephen J Lubben, "The 'New and Improved' Chapter 11" (2005) 93:4 Ky LJ 839;

George W Kuney, "Hijacking Chapter 11" (2004) 21:1 Emory Bank Dev J 19 at 111.
60 See Lynn M LoPucki &Joseph W Doherty, "Bankruptcy Fire Sales" (2007) 106:1 Mich L
61

Rev 1.
Douglas G Baird & Robert K Rasmussen, 'Chapter 11 at Twilight" (2003) 56:3 Stan L
Rev 673.
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harm, no foul" argument was very likely a product of the specific time when
Baird and Rasmussen wrote their papers: during the early part of this century
the American bankruptcy system was still dealing with the remnants of the
"tech bubble" of the late 1990s, meaning that many debtors of that era
had
fewer fixed assets than before, and, as we now know all too well, there was
also a simultaneous credit bubble that allowed for purchasers to easily
finance the acquisition of distressed assets, which no doubt reduced the risk
that quick sales would result in reduced prices.62
In this paper we present a new justification for quick sales that turns on
the presence of involuntary creditors, especially environmental claims.
Particularly in the U.S., as we develop further below, the existing case law on
environmental claims in reorganization proceedings strongly encourages the
breakup of the firm: untainted assets are transferred to a new owner, while
the old debtor liquidates the contaminated property along with a
distribution of the sale proceeds.
In Canada a similar set of issues are at stake, although the law is less
developed on this point-especially since the asset sale provision of the
CCA,4 is relatively new, its current form only coming into being with the
2009 reforms to the CCA,4. In the past, without any express provisions
dealing with asset sales in the CCA,4, Canadian courts relied on their powers
63
to impose terms and conditions under a stay order.
The tendency to move towards sales as opposed to reorganization plans is
driven by two related factors: the focus on environmental obligations'status
as "claims", and the development in both chapter 11 and the CCAA of a
strong ability to sell assets free and clear of charges on those assets.
The question ofwhether an environmental obligation is a claim has been
particularly significant in the U.S., but the apparent victory of environmental
regulators on this point is apt to be hollow, as it depends on the debtor's
continued operations postinsolvency. And the growing strength of sale
orders, transferring assets free and clear of obligations, means that the debtor
and its controlling creditors are increasingly unconcerned about the ability
62

63

See Harvey R Miller & Shai Y Waisman, "Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?" (2005) 47:1 BCL
Rev 129 at 156.
CCAA, supra note 10, s 11.
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to obtain a discharge at the end of the reorganization process. As the
discharge loses its significance, the power of involuntary creditors is apt
to dwindle.
A.

ENVIRONMENTAL"CLAIMS"

The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides that the confirmation of a chapter 11
plan discharges the debtor from any debt-defined as "liability on a claim"that arose before the date of confirmation.64 A"claim", in turn, is defined to
include both a "right to payment" and a "right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment "6"
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge "operates as an injunction against
the commencement or continuation ofan action, the employment ofprocess,
or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of
the debtor". "'
In the environmental context, a court must therefore determine whether
an obligation for environmental cleanup liability constitutes a prepetition
claim.67 As noted, the result of more than 30 years of litigation tells us the
prebankruptcy obligations to pay for past cleanup are dischargeable,68 so long
as the discharge comes after the enactment of the relevant environmental
statute,69 while the duty to comply with environmental regulatory laws and
clean up currently contaminated property is not dischargeable. 7' Thus
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cleanup obligations imposed on owners of contaminated land under
71
CERCLA run with the land and will not be discharged in bankruptcy.
In Canada, both the BIA and CCAA establish that environmental claims
constitute "provable claims" in bankruptcy. Specifically, under section
14.06(8) of the BIA and section 11.8(9) of the CCAA, a claim against the
debtor company for the costs of remedying any environmental conditions or
environmental damage affecting real property or an immovable of the debtor
shall be a provable claim, regardless of whether the condition arose or the
damage occurred before or after the date of the filing under which
proceedings were commenced under both of those Acts.72
The provability issue was explored in Newfoundland and Labrador v

AbitibiBowater Inc, 73 where the topic of environmental cleanup costs was
broached by the Quebec Court of Appeal. Here, the Minister of
Environment and Conservation of Newfoundland and Labrador issued five
ministerial orders (MEC orders) against the debtor, mandating the complete
environmental remediation of sites where it had conducted large-scale
industrial activities. 74 At the time when the orders were issued, however, the
debtor had already filed for protection under the CCAA.A claims procedure
order was then made, directing the debtor's creditors to file their proofs
claim by the claims bar date. In response, the province argued that the
statutory duty to remediate contaminated property could not be considered
a claim under the claims procedure or the CCAA; thus, the MEC orders were
not affected by the claims bar process. However, the Quebec Superior Court
and Court ofAppeal both dismissed the province's motion. Most recently,
the Supreme Court of Canada granted the province leave to appeal in this
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matter and the appeal was heard on 16 November 2011 with the judgment
reserved."
In the US., nondischargeability of environmental orders means that
orders to clean up property can continue to be enforced during76 and after
the debtor's reorganization case.77 Moreover, as an ongoing obligation, the
duty to remediate may be entitled to be characterized as an expense of
administering the reorganization." Underchapter 11, such expenses must be
paid in full, in cash, before a reorganization plan can be confirmed by the
79
court.
In Canada, this is not necessarily the case. Rather, Canadian courts have
held that environmental cleanup costs can be compromised during the
restructuring process, and therefore do not have to be paid in full before a
plan of arrangement or compromise can be approved the court. For example,
in the AbitibiBo water appeal, 8 ° the Quebec Court ofAppeal upheld a lower
court decision that provincial environmental claims against the debtor were
simply financial in nature and should therefore be treated as ordinary claims
under the CCAA, which are subject to compromise under the Act.
In that case, the debtor (Abitibi) was one of the world's largest publicly
traded pulp and paper companies, and had carried on industrial activities at
several locations in Quebec.8 Shortly after the debtor filed under the
CC4,82 the province, pursuant to the EnvironmentalProtectionAct,83 issued
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several orders requesting that the company perform remediation on the land
where the company had carried on industrial activities.84 The province
brought a motion seeking a declaration that the orders were not affected by
the CCA.4 proceedings and not stayed by the initial order under the CCAA. 85
Yet, the judge who heard the motions hearing held that the orders were
financial in nature and should therefore be treated as claims under the CCAA
and subject to compromise.86 The province appealed this decision, but the
appellate judge upheld the motion judge's findings, holding that his decision
did not immunize the company from compliance with environmental orders;
rather, his decision merely characterized them in the context of the
restructuring process engaged pursuant to the CCAA.. 7 Although this case
did not specifically touch on the ability to discharge environmental claims
under the CCAA, the Court's insistence that these claims be treated as any
other financial claims under the Act-and be subject to compromise
accordingly-hints that these claims would also be discharged in the same
manner as other financial claims under the Act. The manner in which
environmental remediation claims are treated in Canada is distinct from the
way they are dealt with in the U.S., insofar as these claims do not necessarily
have to be paid in full in Canada.
In short, having won the battle to determine that environmental
obligations are not prebankruptcy claims, environmental regulators in the
U.S. seemingly obtained a privileged position for these types of involuntary
claims. The claims continue to be enforceable against the debtor, despite the
bankruptcy, and must be paid in full before the debtor can leave chapter I 1."
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The situation is more uncertain in Canada, and the AbitibiBowaterappeal
suggests that such claims would not continue to be enforceable against
the debtor.
But this assumes that the debtor's goal is to leave reorganization and
resume normal operations, and that the only way to do that is at the end of its
case. But a sale of the debtor's assets to a new entity-less any contaminated
assets-can achieve the same result, without implicating the "victory"
environmental regulators seemingly won when they avoided having their
claims subjected to the bankruptcy process.
Indeed, it would seem that American environmental regulators placed
too much focus on the continued existence of the debtor as a specific legal
entity. The ability to assert an administrative claim that is entitled to be paid
in full only matters if the debtor intends to propose a plan, and the ability to
assert a claim against the debtor after bankruptcy only works if the debtor
will be around after bankruptcy.
But if the debtor can achieve the equivalent of reorganization by selling
its uncontaminated assets to a new legal entity, which will quickly adopt the
debtor's old name, then there is no need to follow all the steps of a traditional
reorganization. Instead, the debtor will happily leave the remnant bits of its
former self to face liquidation or even abandonment.
The key to the debtor's ability to do this turns on the CCAA's and
Bankruptcy Code's provisions providing for sales free and clear of prior
claims, which we turn to next.
B.

SALE ASA DISCHARGE SUBSTITUTE

If a debtor stays largely intact during its reorganization, the scope of its
discharge at the end of the CCAA or chapter 11 process is key. But if the
debtor sells most of its assets, discharge wanes in importance. And if the
debtor can create a new entity to buy its assets, then the distinction between
"normal" reorganization and sale vanishes from an operational perspective,
and the only question is which process better rids the assets of past errors,
thus maximizing the value of the same.
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Outside of reorganization, the general rule is that an asset sale does not
result in a transfer of liabilities, unlike a merger.89 But several other doctrines
limit the general rule. For example, in many jurisdictions in the U.S., courts
have developed successor liability doctrines that lead to continued liability
for a purchaser for product defects. 9 Moreover, a buyer outside of
reorganization takes subject to the risk that the transaction will be
challenged expost as a fraudulent transfer, if the debtor is deemed to have
sold its assets "too cheap"
Thus, in the chapter 11 or CCAA sale context, the vital feature of
reorganization law is the ability to sell assets free and clear of claims to the
buyer. For example, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the
trustee or a debtor in possession to sell property of a debtor "free and clear of
any interest in such property'" An interest in property includes claims that
arise from the assets being sold.
Essentially, section 363(f) authorizes the bankruptcycourt to grant relief
similar to the discharge enjoyed by debtors under the Bankruptcy Code,
exonerating a buyer from successor liability, including liability for the
debtor's environmental claims that are unrelated to the purchased assets. The
CCAA allows for similar protection, authorizing a court to order that the
property be sold to the purchaser free and clear of charges, liens,
and restrictions.92
This includes protection from the environmental claims that the debtor
owes, so long as the purchased assets do not include contaminated assets.
Thus, for example, General Motors sold its "good" assets to a newly created
company and its surviving business is now free of any obligations from its
formerly owned contaminated properties. Creditors could file claims in the
bankruptcy case and perhaps get small distributions, but the new company
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C.f Del CodeAnn tit 8 §271 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws 2012, chs 204-234) with

90

Del Code Ann tit 8 §253 (West, Westlaw through 78 Laws, chs 204-234).
See e.g. Ray vAlad Corp, 560 P (2d) 3 (Cal 1977).

9' 11 USC§ 363(f) (2006).
92
CCAA, supra note 10, s 36(6).

2012

INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS

called GM is free of these obligations.93Accordingly, it is possible-as long as
the debtor company does not sell its contaminated property-for a debtor
subject to environmental claims to affect a sale of its assets, largely free and
clear of charges liens and restrictions.
In Canada, this has been held to mean that an interim receiver can
distribute the assets of the debtor's estate, as long as those assets are business
assets, as opposed to the real property subject to contamination-related liens
by the federal or provincial government. For instance, as discussed earlier, in
GeneralChemicalAppeal,the Ontario Court ofAppeal examined the issue of
selling the debtor's assets when they are subject to an environmental claim.94
Here, the interim receiver sought approval for a sale of the debtor's assets,
while the MOE opposed the distribution on the grounds that the debtor had
contaminated the site of one of its plants, and the remediation costs for
cleaning up this contamination were estimated to be quite high; accordingly,
the province was anxious to have the assets of General Chemical available to
pay for the cleanup."
However, in this instance, the assets that the receiver was looking to sell
were those from the operation of the debtor's business and not the debtor's
contaminated real property, over which the province has superpriority under
the BIA and the CCAA. As such, the Court held that the province did not
have a security interest in General Chemical's operating assets."Accordingly,
the sale of the debtor's assets was allowed on the facts of this case.
In contrast, part of the AbitibiBowatercase dealt with the sale of several
contaminated waste disposal sites. In a factum by the Province of Ontario,
submitted to the Quebec Superior Court, the province opposed Abitibi's
motion for an order authorizing the sale of these contaminated sites, on the
93
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basis that it was not in the public interest to do so. 97 Specifically, the province
argued that the sale was contrary to the public interest since the effect of the
sale would be to authorize the debtor to shed its regulatory environmental
responsibilities in respect of its waste disposal sites; moreover, the province
alleged that there was no evidence that if the sale was disallowed that the
CCA,4 reorganization ofAbitibi would fail. This is important in light of the
fact that section 36 of the CCAA4 now requires a debtor company to obtain
the authorization of a court before selling its assets outside of the ordinary
course of business;" one of the key factors to be considered by the court in
making such a determination is "the effects of the proposed sale or
disposition on the creditors and other interested parties", including the
public." Accordingly, this factum not only hints that the test upon which
asset sales should be judged is whether, if denied, there is a reasonable
prospect that the restructuringwill fail. The province's claims also imply that
there should be a distinction between the sale of real property and the sale of
operating assets when a debtor is subject to environmental claims.
Notice, however, that this case reverses the typical structure, particularly
in the U.S., where the debtor wants to sell everything but the contaminated
property. In such a situation, the environmental claimant has two options:
object to the sale or seek to obtain a priority claim against the sale proceeds.
The first strategy is often the reflexive position of environmental claimants,
but is only useful if the claimant considers the question of what will happen
if it succeeds. In particular, blocking a sale to force a liquidation of the debtor
is both socially inefficient and unlikely to benefit the objecting claimant. The
second strategy, seeking priority access to the sale proceeds, will likely place
the environmental creditor in competition with senior secured creditors.
Both of these strategies are examined in the larger context of modern
corporate reorganization practice, in the next part of this paper.
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ADJUSTING TO THE NEW REALITY
If debtors with environmental obligations and other involuntary obligations
increasingly turn to quick sales to realize the value of their assets, then
strategies designed to exempt environmental claims and other involuntary
debt claims from the bankruptcy or insolvency process are no longer viable.
Environmental claimants and other involuntary creditors will increasingly
have to work within the insolvency system to protect their interests. Any
attempt by the judiciary to continue to operate under the old regime will
distort the current framework and have significant implications for the
lending market, as well as the ultimate objective of maximizing the value
available to all creditors.
But before proceeding, it makes some sense to consider if the solution to
the problem of involuntary creditors under a regime of quick sales might not
be addressed by simply prohibiting quick sales or limiting them to cases were
the debtor's assets are literally perishable. This idea traces back to the U.S.
BankruptcyAct of 1867"' and was the rule in the U.S. before the enactment
of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978: preplan asset sales were only
permitted in cases involving debtors with inventory of dairy products or
vegetables, or where some other similar factor prevented the debtor from
selling the assets as part of a full plan.'
Such a rule might make sense if we assume that the bulk of the current
quick sales are substitutes for full reorganization cases. If, however, many
current quick sales substitute for liquidations, the desirability of such a rule
becomes rather suspect. And for a court faced with a debtor that asserts it
will have to liquidate if it does not sell key assets quickly, the question of
which type of debtor this might be is fraught with serious consequences,
particularly if the court guesses wrong. Moreover, adopting a blanket rule
against quick sales without understanding the larger empirical question of
which type of debtor predominates would seem to be equally problematic.

10 61 US Rev St §§ 4972-5132 (1875).
101 See e.g. Re VLoewer' Gambrinus Brewery, 141 F (2d) 747 (2d Cir 1944); Re SolarMfg
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In this context, we argue that the naive solution ofpreventing quick sales
is unlikely to prevail, and creditors, including involuntary creditors, thus
need to adapt to the new reality. 11 2 And the reorganization process itself
needs to adapt to ensure that the process is being used to maximize the value
of the debtor's assets, and not merely to transfer wealth among claimants.
To understand the necessary adaptions, it helps to begin with an
exposition of precisely how a reorganization scheme based around quick
assets sales could harm involuntary creditors. It is not a harm to creditors,
voluntary or involuntary, when a sale results in little or no recovery for
unsecured creditors or shareholders. Rather, the key issue is whether the sale
results in the realization of less value by junior claimants than a traditional
reorganization or liquidation.
A sale thus could result in the realization of equal value, but see that value
diverted to senior creditors. This is a problem of redistribution. Some of the
more nefarious versions of this problem have already been well ventilated in
the literature, particularly in the U.S. Thus, there is real concern that the sale
process might facilitate collusion between management and senior creditors
to squeeze out junior creditors and shareholders.
But the sale process also reduces the holdout powers that junior creditors
have in a more formal reorganization. For example, a chapter 11 plan can
only be confirmed-even under the "cramdown" power that allows plans to
overcome creditor objections-if the plan has been accepted by one class of
impaired creditors. 3 A plan that pays secured creditors in full but leaves
unsecured creditors with little or nothing might be rejected by the unsecured
creditors, leaving the plan without an accepting impaired class." ° But the
same transaction conducted as a sale could well be approved over the
objection of creditors.
Similarly, if a cleanup obligation is a postpetition administrative claim,
the claimant has the right to demand payment in full before the debtor's plan
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can be confirmed. °5 On the other hand, it is possible for the debtor to sell its
assets without providing for full payment of administrative claimsalthough conversion to chapter 7 or dismissal of the case might be a likely
result postsale.
In both instances, the junior creditors lose power, and thus value, by the
move from plans to sales. It may be that, from a policy perspective, the value
junior claimants lose in these latter examples results in a net efficiency gainfor example, if the junior creditors' right to impede a plan is nothing more
than the power to extort rents from senior creditors, the ability to sidestep
the holdup power through a sale is a good thing.
But a system of corporate reorganization is a system of checks and
balances, and one should be hesitant to throw away one of those checks on
the simple ground of expediency. Whether the junior creditors are simply
extractingvalue they are not entitled to, or whether they are putting the stop
to senior creditor overreaching, is an unanswered empirical question. And
while some junior creditors can price senior creditor expropriation ex ante,
involuntary creditors such as environmental claimants cannot.
At this point, it is also important to consider efficiency from a somewhat
broader perspective than is typical in much of the bankruptcy literature. In
particular, while a specific creditor's decision to block the debtor's plan
might seem inefficient within the internal context of insolvency law, from a
broader societal perspective it might be that reorganization in the face of
unpaid and unaddressed environmental claims is actually inefficient overall.
At the same time, and as will be discussed more fully below, it might be that
these larger issues are better served in some way other than by a power to
block the debtor's reorganization.
Asale might also result in lost value if the structure of the sale is such that
it depresses the value of the debtor's assets. For example, if the sale is rushed
or conducted in a way that discourages competitive bidding, it might not
realize full value for the claimants. Value is not being redirected, rather it is
simply lost to the parties to the reorganization. Presumably, the buyer of the
assets realizes the value by obtaining a bargain price.
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Senior lenders arguably do not have an incentive to control this issue
unless the structural problems are so severe that they threaten senior
claimants' recoveries." 6 However, it is important in this context to
distinguish between depressed value that results from generally distressed
asset prices in the industry, as opposed to debtor-specific asset price
depression caused by the sale itself.
The senior lender's ability to "credit bid" their secured claim as sale
consideration will provide some check against a sale that undervalues the
debtor, 7but it also suggests that in some cases the distinction between value
diversion and value loss will be hard to perceive. If the debtor sets up a faulty
sale process, which allows the senior lender to take the debtor's assets at a
discount, the two flavours of sale problems meet in the middle.
Thus an involuntary creditor, like an environmental claimant, needs to
consider two related types of harm that come from the use of a sale in place
of a plan: the sale to an outsider at less than full value, and the sale to the
senior creditor at less than full value. An involuntary creditor might also
worry about their loss of holdup power, and that is a concern if that power
prevents socially inefficient asset transfers.
In the latter case, the inefficiencies primarily arise from the debtor
externalizing the cost of its environmental contamination. The beneficiary of
this is primarily the senior lenders, who receive the sale proceeds.
This suggests that Canada might be on the right track when it provides
environmental claims with a superpriority, but maybe it does not go far
enough. In particular, maybe the superpriority claim needs to be against the
debtor's enterprise, rather than the specific piece of contaminated property.
And note that such a superpriority works even in cases where the lender is
oversecured and would otherwise be inclined to underinvest in monitoring
the debtor, since the superpriority puts the lender's equity cushion at risk.
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But broad notions of enterprise liability are probably more apt to be
academic than real, especially given the threat any such argument would pose
0
to asset-backed securitization."'
The U.S. might consider adopting at least
the Canadian version of the superpriority rule.
And there might be some room to construct a middle-ground mechanism
to address the issue of unpaid environmental liabilities in the corporate
group. For example, under U.S. banking law, regulators have the power to
require financially-distressed banks to obtain contractual capital
commitments from their parent companies. 9 These agreements, which
imposed fixed potential liabilities on the parent company, are then subject to
special priority status in the parent's subsequent bankruptcy case.1 1'Asimilar
model might work with regard to environmental claims.
Adopting an expanded version of the Canadian superpriority model or
contracting for parent-company liability takes care of the problem of debtors
that transfer value from environmental claimants to senior lenders, but there
still remains the problem of debtors who sell their assets too cheaply. This
latter effect amounts to a transfer from junior creditors, including any
involuntary creditors who do not benefit from a superpriority.
It can be expected that banks and other financial institutions will argue
that a broadening of the superpriority-or the creation of it, in the case of
the U.S.-will discourage lending to companies that have any connection
with environmental pollution. But in part, that is exactly the point: make
companies internalize the cost they impose on involuntary creditors, such as
environmental claimants. This issue was front and centre with respect to a
different type of involuntary creditor-pension claimants-in a recent
Ontario Court of Appeal decision.

108 An insurance or
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that such a system is subject to the same information constraints that prevent an
involuntary creditor from pricing the risk of nonpayment in the first instance. Only an
overinclusive insurance or bonding requirement would seem able to overcome
this problem.
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ReIndalexLimited1"' concerned a cross-border proceedingwhere Indalex
filed for CCAA4 protection in Canada, and Indalex's parent companies and
U.S. based affiliates sought chapter 11 protection in the U.S. The Canadian
company was sold through a quick sale in the CCAA proceedings but the sale
proceeds were insufficient to repay the debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders.
The U.S. parent company covered the shortfall, in accordance with its
obligations under a guarantee.' 2 At issue in the Court ofAppeal decision was
whether the U.S. parent company or the pension plan beneficiaries could
claim the money from the sale proceeds held by the monitor in a reserve
fund. The U.S. parent claimed the funds based on its payment under the
guarantee and the pension plan beneficiaries claimed the money based on
deemed trust provisions in the provincial pension legislation.' 3
Justice Gillese concluded that the deemed trust continued to operate
under provincial law and stood ahead of the DIP lenders' superpriority."4 In
addition, she held that the employer had breached its fiduciary duties by
wearing "two hats", as the administrator of the pension plans with fiduciary
duties to the pension plan beneficiaries, and also as a corporation with a duty
to act in its own best interests." 5 The remedy for this breach was a
6
constructive trust in favour of the pension plan beneficiaries."
In rendering her decision in Indalex,Justice Gillese was not prepared to
address the issue of adapting to the new corporate reorganization model of
quick sales and the impact of expanding priority for involuntary creditors in
this context. She observed that the case concerned a liquidating CCAA
proceeding and that there was no restructuring of the company."7 However,
she was also not prepared to consider how such a reality should be taken into
account in dealing with unpaid pension obligations.
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Already, comments from a number of the top Canadian law firms
suggests that lending has been impacted by the decision and deals have been
put on hold."' Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted
in Indalex on 19 January 2012.19
While Justice Gillese is convinced that Canadian corporate-law duties
force directors of a corporation on the cusp ofa CCAA filing to consider the
broader societal-like concerns, she does not propose solution for how the
uncertainty around superpriority created by her decision can be dealt with.
That is, even CCAA proceedings that result in quick sales require a DIP
lender to fund the process.
A better point in time to consider whether and how a quick sale will
impact involuntary creditors, like the pension claimants in Indalex, is the
CCAA's new section 36 process for approval by the court of a quick sale.
Priorities need to be clear and not altered on a case by case basis.
More generally, to the extent there exists a gap between the private,
internal efficiency of a reorganization case and questions of social efficiency,
which are of sufficient nuance that they can not be addressed by statute ex
ante, there needs to be a mechanism to place such questions before the court.
This is one area where the Canadian monitor, who is not beholden to any
particular stakeholder in the case, might provide a better tool than its
American counterpart. Specifically, it cannot be expected that a creditors'
committee will consider issues beyond the class it represents.
On the other hand, consideration has to be given to the structure of the
sale process itself In particular, safeguards have to be in place to protect
against collusion between the debtor's management and senior lenders. In
this regard, the tendency to subject deals to "higher and better" offers, much
more common in the U.S. than in Canada, is a step in the right direction. But
118 See e.g. Robin B Schwill, "Re lndalex Limited: When Good Intentions Made Bad Law"
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there is still a need for vigilance against sale structures that are auctions in
name only.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have identified three key issues that must be dealt with in the context of
the treatment of involuntary creditors and the new reality of quick sales in
reorganizations under the CCA,4 and chapter 11:
1. involuntary creditors lose the ability to object;
2. quick sales may result in lost value that could have gone to involuntary
creditors; and
3. broader issues of efficiency and externalities.
As we have already suggested, the appropriate response to these concerns
must be clear and consistent and not result in uncertainty around priorities
of voluntary creditors. The following responses may be considered:
1. The monitor or the U.S. creditor committees may be a proxy for the lost
voice of involuntary creditors. In addition, representative counsel,
appointed by the court and paid for by the estate of the debtor, may
fulfill this role.
2. The requirement of an auction in "nonemergency" situations to ensure
that value is not lost that could potentially have gone to the involuntary
creditors.
3. The requirement that the public interest is considered in the section 36
sale process test may serve as an example of how externalities and
broader efficiency-related issues may be considered at an early stage in
the process.

